Abstract: Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller elicited experimental subjects' initial responses to twoperson constant-sum "Hide-and-Seek" games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria and non-neutral framing of locations. The least focal location was the most prevalent choice for both Hiders and Seekers, and more prevalent for Seekers than Hiders. This robust pattern is puzzling because it deviates from equilibrium in a game where its theoretical rationale is strong and confers an advantage on Seekers, relative to equilibrium. This paper compares alternative explanations of the observed patterns theoretically and econometrically, and proposes a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses based on "level-k" types to explain them.
Introduction
Rubinstein and Tversky (1993; henceforth "RT"), Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996;  "RTH"), and Rubinstein (1999; "R") reported intriguing experimental results from two-person constant-sum "Hide-and-Seek" games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria and non-neutral framing of locations. In a leading example of their games, one player (the Hider) hides a "treasure" in one of four locations, listed left to right and labeled A, B, A, A; and the other player (the Seeker) looks in one of the locations. Because the Seeker looks without observing the Hider's choice, their decisions are strategically simultaneous. If the Seeker "finds" the treasure his payoff is 1 and the Hider's is 0; if not the Hider's payoff is 1 and the Seeker's is 0.
2 The structures, including the order and labeling of locations, were publicly announced. Figure 1 gives the payoff matrix. Under these conditions, it is natural to compare the experimental results in RT, RTH, and R (collectively "RTH" from now on) with equilibrium predictions based on complete information. 4 The games then have unique mixed-strategy equilibria, in which players randomize with equal probabilities on the four locations. The Hider has an advantage, with equilibrium expected payoff ¾ versus the Seeker's ¼. More importantly, the equilibrium leaves no room for the labeling and presentation of locations to influence behavior, because its strategies treat both the focally labeled B location and the central A location symmetrically with the two end A locations.
The publicly announced labeling and presentation nonetheless create a potential for framing effects, and RTH's subjects' responses deviated systematically from equilibrium in ways that were highly sensitive to framing. Table I gives aggregate choice frequencies for the RTH-4 treatment just described and related Hide-and-Seek treatments reported in RTH. In the top half are and the five most closely analogous treatments, on which we focus in our analysis. 5 These include three more "Treasure" treatments, RT-AABA-Treasure (with the B in the third position, perhaps because it was run in Hebrew), RT-1234-Treasure, and R-ABAA. They also include two "Mine"
treatments, RT-AABA-Mine and RT-1234-Mine, identical to the analogous Treasure treatments except that Hiders' and Seekers' payoffs are interchanged. This yields an equivalent normal form with players' roles reversed, leaving equilibrium predictions unchanged, mutatis mutandis.
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In the three ABAA or AABA Treasure treatments and the AABA Mine treatment, central
A-the only location that is neither at one of the ends, which RT and RTH argue are inherently focal, nor focally labeled-is a strongly modal choice for both Hiders and Seekers. 7 This pattern extends to the 1234 Treasure and Mine treatments if we take 2 as analogous to B and 3 to central A, which is consistent with RT's observation that "the least salient response…may correspond to 3, or perhaps 2." We take 2 to be analogous to B from now on, and sometimes use "central A" ("B") to refer to either a central A (B) or a 3 (2) location. Further, central A is more prevalent for Seekers than Hiders in all four Treasure treatments and more prevalent for Hiders than Seekers in both Mine treatments, so this pattern is also the same in all six cases if Hiders in Treasure and Seekers in Mine treatments are treated as equivalent. In five of the treatments, B and the end locations all have frequencies less than 25%; the only exception is B in RTH-4, where the frequency gap between central A and B is 2-5 times smaller than in the other treatments. Finally, the frequencies with which Seekers find a Treasure or a Mine are both greater than ¼, and as a result Seekers (Hiders) 4 The monetary payoffs appeared sufficient to motivate subjects, and the binary-lottery structure of the payoff function implies under standard assumptions that players maximize expected payoffs without regard to their risk preferences. 5 Table I also gives results for further RTH treatments with payoff structures like RTH-ABAA-4 but frames with positive or negative connotations and/or focally labeled end locations. RTH-2 and RTH-5 are equivalent to RTH-ABAA-4 except for the negative or positive connotation of the focal label (in italics). RTH-1 and RTH-3 are equivalent to RTH-ABAA-4 except that the focal label is at one of the end positions, and in RTH-3 it has a negative connotation. RTH-6 is equivalent to RTH-5 except that the focal location is in the third rather than second position; and to RTH-2 and RTH-4 except for this difference in position and that the focal decision has a positive connotation in RTH-6 but negative or neutral connotations in RTH-2 or RTH-4. Those treatments' results echo the patterns of treatments in which focal labels have neutral connotations and central positions. Individual cross-treatment data would be helpful, but are no longer available. In R's experiments, subjects were unpaid and were not screened for prior exposure to game theory. 6 Because Hiders inherently move first, Mine treatments have different extensive forms even though Seekers do not observe Hiders' choices before making their own choices. RTH's Mine treatments test whether this difference made it easier for Seekers to mentally simulate Hiders' choices. If so, this would have explained some of the role-asymmetric patterns in their data; but the Mine treatments yielded results very close to the Treasure treatments with roles reversed. (Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004) found weak effects of timing without observability in other games.) This suggests that the patterns are driven by subjects' responses to the normal-form structure, as in the explanations considered here. 7 RTH cite Christenfeld (1995) in support of a bias against end points in individual decisions. See also R's discussion of Ayton and Falk's (1995) Sample sizes in parentheses; focal labels in italics; order of presentation of locations to subjects as shown.
These patterns of deviation from equilibrium are intriguing because they are systematically asymmetric across player roles in ways that equilibrium does not help to explain. 8 RT and RTH did not consider alternative explanations, with the exception noted in fn. 6, and instead took the patterns as prima facie evidence that their subjects did not think correctly about the games. 9 In our view such robust patterns are unlikely to lack a coherent explanation; and given the simplicity of the strategic questions the games pose, the explanation seems unlikely to be non-game-theoretic.
On the contrary, the fact that the patterns occur in simple competitive games where the theoretical rationale for equilibrium is especially strong and subjects' responses to framing help subjects in one player role and hurt those in the other makes them a natural "proving ground" for theories that relax or replace the equilibrium assumption in ways that leave room for framing to influence behavior.
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Finding an explanation for RTH's results within this broader class of models is likely to teach us something about strategic behavior whose usefulness will extend well beyond their simple games.
In this paper we compare and evaluate alternative theoretical explanations of RTH's results and conduct an illustrative econometric analysis that helps to discriminate among explanations. The explanations differ on two dimensions: the extent to which players' beliefs are coordinated and how the effects of the labeling and presentation of locations are incorporated into the analysis.
Section 2 begins with perhaps the simplest way to try to explain RTH's subjects' responses to framing: an equilibrium analysis of their Hide-and-Seek game with payoff perturbations that introduce "hard-wired" preferences of Hiders and Seekers respectively against or for focally labeled and/or end locations in a parsimonious but behaviorally plausible way (Figure 2 ). The resulting model allows framing to affect behavior, but treats its effect as part of the game rather than player's strategic responses to it. We show that this model can easily explain the prevalence of central A for both Hiders and Seekers with perturbations of equal magnitudes (but opposite signs) for both; but that it can only explain the greater prevalence of central A for Seekers than Hiders by postulating a large unexplained difference in the magnitudes of the perturbations.
8 Although with random pairing equilibrium restricts only players' beliefs, the deviations remain problematic because systematic deviations from equilibrium choice frequencies indicate systematic deviations from equilibrium beliefs. 9 RT: "The finding that both choosers and guessers selected the least salient alternative suggests little or no strategic thinking." RTH: "In the competitive games, however, the players employed a naïve strategy (avoiding the endpoints), that is not guided by valid strategic reasoning. In particular, the hiders in this experiment either did not expect that the seekers too, will tend to avoid the endpoints, or else did not appreciate the strategic consequences of this expectation." 10 Other studies of framing effects in games include Scharlemann et al. (2001) , who studied trust games in otherwise anonymous players were "labeled" by photographs; and Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994) , who studied coordination games in which decisions had naturally occurring labels with commonly understood focality, as in Schelling's (1960) classic "meeting in New York City" experiments. Wilson (1994, 1995) , Nagel (1995) , Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998) , CostaGomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) , Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) , and Costa-Gomes and
Crawford (2004)). We assume that with given probabilities, each player role is filled by one of two "level-k" decision rules or "types": L1 or L2. Each type begins by anchoring its beliefs in a naïve L0 type, described below, and adjusts them via thought-experiments involving iterated best responses:
L1 best responds to L0 (with error), and L2 best responds to L1 (also with error). 12 Both have accurate models of the game and are rational in the decision-theoretic sense; they depart from 11 By contrast, Rosenthal, Shachat, and Walker (2003) find that QRE does explain the qualitative features of the systematically role-asymmetric behavior they observed in experimental 2x2 Hide-and-Seek games. However, that asymmetry is driven by a different kind of payoff perturbation, which is unrelated to framing or focality. See also McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (2000) , who find that QRE explains results from other zero-sum games less well. 12 Thus L0 exists only in the minds of L1 and L2. If L0 were allowed to have positive probability it would be weakly separated from errors by L1 or L2 in Section 5's econometric model, and the model would have similar substantive implications. In the unperturbed Hide-and-Seek game the choices of Lk types as defined here cycle, so that L5, L9… are equivalent to L1, and so on. Thus the most general level-k model would include L0 through L4. We focus on the model with only L1 and L2 because there is considerable evidence (see Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004) and the papers discussed there) that they are much more common than Lk with k > 2. We show in Section 4 that if L3 is too much more common in the population than L1, the model can explain neither the prevalence of central A for both Hiders and Seekers nor the fact that Seekers find the treasure more frequently than in equilibrium. Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004) also provide support for our assumptions that L2 best responds to a noiseless L1 and to L1 alone rather than a mixture of L1 and L0, unlike in Stahl and Wilson (1995) or Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) .
equilibrium only in basing beliefs on a simplified model of other players. This yields a workable model of others' choices while avoiding the cognitive complexity of equilibrium analysis.
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Because L1 and L2 ignore framing except as it affects the anchoring type L0, L0 is the key to the model's potential to explain RTH's results. Our specification rests on behaviorally plausible assumptions about how focality determines salience and how salience interacts with players'
intuitions about the player roles in Hide-and-Seek. We take L0 to be nonstrategic, as is usual in such analyses, with the exception that it has hard-wired preferences that (in the leading case we focus on) tend to make L0 Seekers favor focally labeled and/or end locations and L0 Hiders avoid them. By contrast with our analyses of equilibrium and QRE, we represent L0's preferences directly as choice probabilities rather than payoff perturbations. This is convenient because L0 serves only to determine L1's and L2's beliefs; and the difference is less important than it may seem because L0's choices could be "purified" by postulating privately observed payoff perturbations.
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The assumed difference between L0 Hiders' and Seekers' choice probabilities qualitatively resembles the hard-wired preferences in the leading cases of our analyses of equilibrium and QRE, but here they are restricted to L0. They reflect the following intuitions in the minds of L1 Hiders and Seekers. L1 Hiders think L0 Seekers will look in "obvious" places because naïve Seekers interpret obviousness as a hint about where to look; L1 Seekers think L0 Hiders will avoid obvious places because naïve Hiders feel exposed in them. Thus L0 Hiders and L0 Seekers are both strategically naïve, except that they react to the game in the light of their different player roles.
Although this aspect of our analysis departs slightly from earlier work, it may not be unreasonable given that L0 represents the beliefs of the strategic types L1 and L2. In any case, our analysis shows that something like this asymmetry is needed to explain RTH's results in a types-based analysis, just as other kinds of asymmetry are needed to explain them in an equilibrium or QRE analysis.
Under these assumptions, we show that the level-k model explains the patterns in RTH's data for behaviorally plausible parameter values, and without assuming differences in the 13 In Selten's (1998) words: "Basic concepts in game theory are often circular in the sense that they are based on definitions by implicit properties…. Boundedly rational strategic reasoning seems to avoid circular concepts. It directly results in a procedure by which a problem solution is found. Each step of the procedure is simple, even if many case distinctions by simple criteria may have to be made." 14 Our assumption that L0 has non-uniform choice probabilities departs from much of the literature Wilson (1994, 1995) , Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) , Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) ; but see Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998) ). In the Hide-and-Seek games considered here, a uniform L0 would make Lk coincide with equilibrium for all k, and so make the model independent of framing. Adapting L0 to the setting is not unprecedented. In Crawford's (2003) players cannot explain the fact that Seekers find the treasure more frequently than in equilibrium.
To put this analysis into perspective, consider an explanation of the prevalence of central A for both Hiders and Seekers that has been suggested to us: "Hiders feel safer avoiding focal locations, so they are more likely to choose central A; Seekers know this, so they are also more likely to choose central A." This sounds plausible, but it has two weaknesses: It implicitly assumes that Hiders are systematically less sophisticated (L0) than Seekers (L1), and it does not explain the greater prevalence of central A for Seekers than Hiders. 16 Our level-k model remedies both weaknesses by showing that plausible frequencies of types L1 and L2, the same for Hiders and Seekers, and defined via plausible (but role-dependent) specifications of L0, can explain both the prevalence of central A for Hiders and Seekers and its greater prevalence for Seekers than Hiders.
Section 4's analysis shows that in RTH's Hide-and-Seek games, the level-k model is a plausible alternative to equilibrium or QRE with payoff perturbations. All three models require a 15 Interchanging the L0 probabilities for Hiders and Seekers for Mine treatments is behaviorally plausible, and explains why RTH's Mine treatments yielded the same results as Treasure treatments with player roles reversed. Our level-k analysis is similar in spirit to Bacharach and Stahl's (2000) "level-k variable-frame" analysis of coordination and Bacharach and Stahl's (1997a) analysis of Hide-and-Seek games (not included in the published version, Bacharach and Stahl (2000) ). Our analysis, however, makes simpler behavioral assumptions: Only our type L0 responds directly to the framing, and our players do no complex reasoning about each other's knowledge of the framing. Bacharach and Stahl's (1997b) title suggests a more detailed version of their Hide-and-Seek analysis, but it is unavailable. 16 Note that the levels of sophistication are meaningfully comparable across roles. The quotation in the text could be inverted to "Seekers are drawn to focal locations, so they are unlikely to choose central A; Hiders know this, so they do choose central A." This uses exactly the same logic with player roles interchanged, but it does not fit the patterns in the data. This seems a clear indication that an explanation will require some empirical knowledge, in addition to logic.
behaviorally plausible but unexplained difference in the directions of Hiders' and Seekers' responses to the framing (for all players in the equilibrium or QRE with perturbations models, for L0 in the level-k model). Equilibrium and QRE with perturbations also require a large, unexplained difference in the magnitudes of the perturbations for Hiders and Seekers. All three models' predictions depend on behavioral parameters that must be estimated or translated from other settings, but the level-k model's parameters (population type frequencies) are more fundamental, and so promise to be more portable and stable across different settings. Finally, the level-k model relaxes the strong assumption of coordination of beliefs that underlies equilibrium or QRE analyses, which may be implausible for subjects' initial responses to a novel situation, particularly
given the need for common knowledge of the payoff perturbations in both player roles. rejected. We therefore compare the equilibrium with perturbations and level-k models when their parameters are allowed to differ across roles. This gives both enough flexibility to fit the observed choice frequencies almost perfectly. In effect the econometrics reduces to a way to calibrate the models to fit the observed frequencies. Equilibrium with perturbations has a small advantage in likelihood, because the constraints it imposes on choice probabilities are slightly less restrictive.
But the level-k model describes the patterns in RTH's data almost as well, and with behaviorally plausible parameter estimates close to those that have estimated for other settings.
Given the flexibility of these models' parameterizations, overfitting is a serious concern. We test for overfitting by re-estimating each model separately for each of the six treatments in the top half of Table I and using each of the re-estimated models to "postdict" the choice frequencies of the other five treatments, evaluating goodness-of-fit by the mean squared deviation between predicted and observed choice frequencies. The level-k model yields parameter estimates that are more stable across treatments and that imply predictions that fit RTH's data better "out of sample." This suggests that the level-k model does a better job of identifying the structure of subjects' responses, and that our estimated model is more likely to yield good predictions in truly new environments.
Section 6 is the conclusion.
Equilibrium with Payoff Perturbations
We begin with what may be the simplest way to try to account for subjects' responses to the framing of RTH's Hide-and-Seek games: standard equilibrium analysis of a perturbed game in which players derive payoffs directly from the locations chosen, over and above their strategic consequences. Figure 2 gives the payoff matrix of our parameterization of the perturbed game.
Following RTH's discussions of subjects' typical responses to salience, we assume that Seekers receive an additional payoff of e for choosing one of the end locations or f for choosing the focally labeled location, and that Hiders lose payoffs of equal magnitudes for such choices.
We take these payoff perturbations to reflect hard-wired preferences, independent of strategic reasoning. But as explained in the Introduction, their motivation is based on strategic intuitions about games like Hide-and-Seek, which make Hiders fear focality (either in labeling or in the end positions) while Seekers are attracted to it. Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the case in which e, f > 0, but we also consider the consequences of alternative assumptions. We begin by assuming that the magnitudes of e and f are the same for Hiders and Seekers because differences across roles could be used to rationalize almost any pattern. In Section 5's econometric analysis we consider the consequences of allowing the magnitudes to differ for Hiders and Seekers. We take the perturbations to be equal for both end locations for simplicity. which is greater than ¼ for any values of e, f > 0, so equilibrium with perturbations can also explain why Seekers find the treasure more frequently than they would in equilibrium. However, central A is played with equal probability in both player roles, so the model cannot explain the greater prevalence of central A for Seekers without assuming an unexplained difference in the magnitudes of e and f across roles: 2e + f must be larger for Hiders than Seekers. 17 We show in Section 5's econometric analysis that when e and f are allowed to differ across Hiders and Seekers, their maximum likelihood estimates are both higher for Hiders. This allows the equilibrium with perturbations model to explain the greater prevalence of central A for Seekers, but we also show that it may allow the model enough flexibility to overfit the data. Further, it may be implausible to assume that this subtle difference is common knowledge among players as required for equilibrium.
Hider/Seeker

Quantal Response Equilibrium
In this section we consider QRE as a possible explanation of RTH's results. QRE captures many features of subjects' deviations from equilibrium in other game experiments. In applications it is often assumed that players' choices follow a logit distribution (hence the term "logit QRE"), with dispersion tuned by a precision parameter. We follow this practice here, but some of our analysis depends only on the property that QRE choice probabilities increase with expected payoff.
Because QRE is defined entirely in terms of the payoff structure, it ignores the framing in RTH's Hide-and Seek game without payoff perturbations. In fact, for any precision, QRE yields the same distribution of choices as the standard equilibrium of the game without decision noise:
Observation 1: In the unperturbed Hide-and-Seek game of Figure 1 , the unique QRE for any distribution and any precision is equivalent to the standard equilibrium without decision noise.
Proof: Fix a distribution and precision, and suppose to the contrary that in a QRE the most probable location for Hiders, say L, has probability greater than ¼. Because QRE choice probabilities increase with expected payoffs and the game is constant-sum, L must then have the highest 17 Larger values are associated with higher probabilities of central A, and Hiders' value determines Seekers' probability.
expected payoff for Seekers, and so has probability greater than ¼ for them. But then some location other than L has higher expected payoff for Hiders, contradicting the initial hypothesis.
Combining QRE with the kind of payoff perturbations considered in Section 2 makes it sensitive to the framing, and so gives it the potential to explain RTH's results. In the perturbed
Hide-and-Seek game of Figure 2 , with e and f small enough to be consistent with a totally mixed equilibrium (-1 < f -2e, 2e -3f, 2e + f < 3), the logit QRE implies probabilities of central A greater 18 There is enough structure to suggest that the qualitative pattern is symptomatic of a theorem, but we have been unable to prove it. Some aspects of the pattern can differ if e and f are allowed to differ across player roles. QRE then still achieves the best fit with a large value of the precision, and so still adds little to equilibrium with perturbations.
A Model with Boundedly Rational "Level-k" Types
Returning to the Hide-and-Seek game without payoff perturbations, we now consider the model with boundedly rational level-k types discussed in the Introduction. Recall that in this model each player role is filled by one of two types, L1 or L2, with the same, given probabilities s and t ≡ 1-s respectively. Each type anchors its beliefs in a naïve L0 type and adjusts them via thoughtexperiments involving iterated best responses: A type-k subject in either role normally chooses type k's location for that role, with L1 best responding to L0, L2 best responding to L1, and any ties broken randomly with equal probabilities. But with probability ε (equal across roles, and equal for L1 and L2) the subject makes an error, in which case he chooses each location with probability ¼.
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The anchoring type L0 plays a dual role in our analysis because we assume that L0 Our assumption that errors result in uniformly distributed choices yields a useful necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a location to be chosen with probability greater than ¼:
Observation 2: In the unperturbed Hide-and-Seek game of Figure 1 , a location can be chosen with probability greater than ¼ in the player population of Hiders or Seekers only if it is a best response for some type that has positive probability in the population.
Proof: If not, the location can be chosen only in error, which never raises its probability above ¼.
Given Observation 2 and assuming a higher frequency of L1 than L2, as in Section 5's estimates and estimates in the literature for other settings, there are only two ways in which the model could explain both stylized facts: (i) central A is a best response for L1 (but not L2) Hiders 19 Symmetry across roles in the error structure is a natural assumption because each role was normally filled by subjects from the same pool, with no attempt to sort them. It avoids begging the question of the source of the role-asymmetric patterns in the data by limiting differences in behavioral assumptions for Hiders and Seekers to their L0 types.
(and possibly L2) Seekers. 21 But (ii) is impossible because, given that L0 for Hiders determines both L1 Seekers' beliefs and L2 Hiders' beliefs about L1 Seekers' beliefs, central A cannot be a best response for both players in Hide and Seek.
We now record some further observations that help to determine when (i) is viable.
Observation 3: In the unperturbed Hide-and-Seek game of Figure 1 , if p H = p S and q H = q S , then central A cannot be a best response for both L1 Hiders and L1 Seekers unless all locations are.
Proof: This would require 3p S + 2q S ≥ 2 and p S + 2q S ≥ 1 for L1 Hiders (the first condition is more stringent iff p S < ½) and 3p H + 2q H ≤ 2 and p H + 2q H ≤ 1 for L1 Seekers (the first condition is more stringent iff p H > ½). If p H = p S ≡ p and q H = q S ≡ q, these imply 3p + 2q = 2 and p + 2q = 1, hence p = ½ and q = ¼. But then central A for Hiders or Seekers is tied with the other locations.
Observation 3 rules out any explanation of the stylized facts in which L1 is more frequent than L2 and p H = p S and q H = q S . We now turn to models in which L0's choice probabilities differ across roles, focusing on the leading case in which p S > ½ and q S > ¼ but p H < ½ and q H < ¼.
Adapting Observation 3's proof yields:
Observation 4: In the unperturbed Hide-and-Seek game of Figure 1 , if p S > ½ and q S > ¼ but p H < ½ and q H < ¼, then central A is a best response for L1 (but not L2) Hiders and L1 and L2 Seekers.
Observation 4 shows that possibility (i) for explaining the stylized facts is viable when p S > ½, q S > ¼, p H < ½, and q H < ¼. 22 Table II and Figure 4 give the details. Something like the conditions of Observation 4 are needed for the model to explain the stylized facts with a higher frequency of L1 than L2. Suppose for example that p S < ½ and q S < ¼ and p H > ½ and q H > ¼, so that L0 Seekers avoid end or focally labeled locations and L0 Hiders favor them. Then L1 Hiders and Seekers avoid central A, L2 Hiders favor it, but L2 Seekers also avoid it; and central A has low probability for Hiders and Seekers, even lower for Seekers than Hiders. Alternative assumptions also fail to explain the stylized facts with reasonable values of the type frequencies. 20 This assumption is less strained than the knowledge assumptions of equilibrium with perturbations, both because it refers only to L0, which reflects more basic intuitions, and because here there is no need for common knowledge. 21 In Hide-and-Seek a best response can be tied with at most two other locations, and so still has probability above ¼. 22 Observation 4's conclusion also holds when p S > ½, q S < ¼, p H > ½, and q H < ¼, as long as 3p H +2q H < 2, p H + 2q H < 1, 3p S + 2q S > 2, and p S + 2q S > 1. information about the distribution of the sophistication parameter k in the subject population. In the Introduction (fn. 12) we justified restricting attention to a model with only L1 and L2 players on the grounds that previous studies suggest that they are much more common than Lk types with k > 2, but it is easy to contemplate alternative assumptions within our framework. Suppose, to make the point as simply as possible, that the population had no L1s at all, only L2s and L3s. In the case considered in Observation 4, which we have argued is the most plausible one, it is then easy to check that L2 and L3 Hiders and L3 Seekers all avoid central A, while L2 Seekers choose it.
Further, if t is the probability of L2 as before, the expected frequency with which Seekers find the treasure is (1-t)/3, less than ¼ whenever t > ¼, which is a reasonable assumption in this case given that types-based analyses normally assign higher probabilities to L2 than L3 (Costa-Gomes and
Crawford (2004), Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) ). Thus, if L3 is too much more common in the population than L1, the model can explain neither the prevalence of central A for both Hiders and Seekers nor the fact that Seekers find the treasure more than equilibrium predicts. This, together with the low frequencies universally estimated for Lk with k > 3, tends to support our simplifying assumption that the population is dominated by L1 and L2.
Econometric Analysis
This section uses RTH's data to compute maximum likelihood estimates of Section 2's equilibrium with payoff perturbations model and Section 4's level-k model. Our analysis is meant to illustrate the models' possibilities, not to take a definitive position on parameter values or the interpretation of behavior. 23 In effect the econometrics are just a way of calibrating the models to fit the observed choice frequencies as well as possible, while yielding likelihoods that can be used to assess goodness of fit and the costs of different parameter restrictions.
Tests for aggregate differences in subjects' decisions across the six RTH treatments on which we focus, treating "B" as analogous to "2" as discussed in the Introduction and transposing as needed to make the frequencies directly comparable across treatments, reveal no differences that are significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, we pool the data from all six treatments. This yields a sample of 624 Hiders and 560 Seekers, with the aggregate choice frequencies shown in Table III . 24 We focus on the level-k model because it poses the only nontrivial estimation problem. Our econometric model is a mixture model with the distributional assumptions introduced in Section 4, in which each subject's type is drawn from a common prior distribution over L1 and L2, with probabilities s and 1-s. We assume that a type-k subject normally chooses type k's decision, but makes an error with probability ε є [0, 1], in which case he chooses each location with probability 1/4. We assume that errors are independently and identically distributed ("i.i.d.") across subjects. respectively. To gauge the magnitudes of these differences, think informally of each model as directly estimating the four choice probabilities in each role, equilibrium with perturbations constraining the predicted frequencies of end locations to be equal (which is not quite true in the sample), and level-k doing this with the added tie-breaking constraint (in the estimated region) that the predicted frequency of the B location should be the same as those of both end locations (which is also not quite true). Given this, likelihood ratio tests show that the difference in likelihood from perfect prediction is insignificant for both models, with p-values 0.2367 and 0.1225 respectively.
We are unaware of any estimates with which to compare the estimated payoff parameters in the equilibrium with perturbations model. Their signs are the same as those required for L0 in our level-k explanation, and are behaviorally plausible. In the level-k model with role-dependent L0 the estimated type frequencies are comparable to, and close to, previous estimates (Stahl and Wilson (1994) , Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) , Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004) , Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) ). The estimated error rate is higher than usual, but not implausibly high for initial responses to an abstractly framed game that must have been unfamiliar to many of RTH's subjects. Perhaps the weakest part of the explanation is that Seekers' choices other than central A are "explained" only by the high error rate, so that Hiders' choices are better explained overall.
25
Given the flexibility of the models' parameterizations, overfitting is a serious concern. It also has the potential to help discriminate between explanations. We test for it by re-estimating each model separately for each of the six treatments in the top half of Table I and then using each of the six estimated models to "postdict" the choice frequencies of the other five treatments, evaluating goodness-of-fit by mean squared deviation ("MSD") between predicted and observed frequencies. Tables IV-VII summarize the results. Although the equilibrium with perturbations model has a better fit within each of the six treatments (diagonal of Table VII), the level-k model yields parameter estimates that are both somewhat more stable across treatments (Table IV) and imply predictions whose MSDs average 29% lower and are lower 23/30 comparisons (Table VII) . 
Conclusion
This paper has compared alternative explanations of the patterns observed in Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller's experiments with two-person constant-sum Hide-and-Seek games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria and non-neutral framing of locations. We find that two models, equilibrium with payoff perturbations and a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses based on boundedly rational "level-k" types, are flexible enough to describe the patterns in the data.
The most general version of the equilibrium with perturbations model has a slight edge in fit, because the constraints it imposes on choice probabilities are slightly less restrictive. But the level-k model has important countervailing advantages. Both models require a behaviorally plausible but unexplained difference in the directions of Hiders' and Seekers' responses to the framing; but the equilibrium with perturbations model also requires a large, unexplained difference in the magnitudes of the perturbations for Hiders and Seekers. Both models' predictions depend on behavioral parameters that must be estimated or translated from other settings; but the level-k model's parameters (population type frequencies) are more fundamental, and so promise to be more portable and stable across different settings. The level-k model also relaxes the strong assumption of coordination of beliefs that underlies equilibrium analysis, which may be implausible for subjects' initial responses to a novel situation, particularly given the need for common knowledge of the payoff perturbations. Finally, our analysis suggests that the level-k model is less inclined to overfit, and so more likely to predict well beyond the sample for which it is estimated.
